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Mississippi has a population of just about three million people, 51.4% of whom are female1, yet 
it has only one abortion provider in the state: the Jackson Women’s Health Organization.2 The clinic’s 
ability to provide those services is tenuous as a result of a 2012 Targeted Regulations of Abortion Providers 
(TRAP) Law,3 Mississippi House Bill 1390,  that mandates only doctors with hospital admitting privileges 
be permitted to perform abortion. Though neutral on face, Mississippi has another law in effect that 
allows for “healthcare facilities to refuse any medical service on religious grounds, which extends to 
granting admitting privileges;”4 the sum effect of these two laws is to systematically eradicate abortion 
in the state. While doctors, all American Medical Association (AMA) board-certified Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (OB-GYNs), at the Jackson Clinic applied for hospital privileges, they were rejected on the 
basis of association with an abortion provide5r, a condemnation of the practice but not of the doctor’s 
abilities to perform. Thus, on the basis of religiously motivated legislators and hospitals, the Jackson 
Clinic’s doctors failed to comply with the TRAP law, and the Clinic received a notice of intent from the 
Mississippi Department of Health that indicated that the Clinic was about to lose its license to operate.  
After receiving the notice of intent, the Jackson Clinic had ten days to request a hearing with the 
Mississippi Department of Health before forced closure, had to wait thirty additional calendar days for 
the Department of Health to set a hearing date on the notice of intent, and knew during the entire process 
that hearing would not result in a favorable outcome.6 This notion was reaffirmed by the Governor of 
Mississippi, Phil Bryant, when he declared that the primary consequence of the TRAP law, to further 
obfuscate attempts by Mississippi women to receive abortions and exercise autonomy in reproductive 
decisions by shuttering all state clinics to increase the distance they would have to travel (out of state) to 
receive such services, was “the first step in a movement… to try to end abortion in Mississippi.”7 This is 
just one of the myriad of ways in which states are passing legislation that almost eliminates the availability 
of safe, legal, and convenient abortions. Leaving the 2,000 women in Mississippi that have abortions 
performed at the Jackson Clinic yearly to devise an alternative way to conclude their reproductive 
quandary in the manner they have chosen is victory for the anti-abortion movement; however, the anti-
1 "Annual Estimates of the Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2012" 
(CSV). 2012 Population Estimates. United States Census Bureau, Population Division. December 2012.  




5 Alissa Quart, "Will Mississippi Close Its Last Abortion Clinic?," The Atlantic Monthly Group., 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/01/will-mississippi-close-its-last-abortion-clinic/267352/. 
6 McDonough, "Mississippi’s Last Abortion Clinic Hangs in the Balance". 
7 Quart, "Will Mississippi Close Its Last Abortion Clinic?". 
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abortion movement is not composed of women forced to have a child they did not want and now must 
provide for financially or force to become a ward of the state.8 Furthermore, since many women seeking 
abortions are in the lower spectrum of income,9 some even struggling to procure the $500 fee that most 
early stage abortions carry, it is extremely unlikely that these women will be able to support a child 
financially without significant assistance of the state. 
The Jackson Women’s Health Organization’s story has a temporarily happy ending: an injunction 
was issued to keep the Clinic operational while it challenged Mississippi’s law in federal court, citing 
unconstitutionally, and Judge Daniel P. Jordan III of the U.S. District Court, while not deciding the 
constitutionality,10 blocked provisions of the TRAP law such that the Clinic could remain open. The Judge 
opined that terminating the right of women to obtain abortions in Mississippi legally would “result in a 
patchwork system where constitutional rights are available in some states but not others.”11 But, while 
the author of the TRAP law contended that the legislation intended to “reducing the number of abortions 
in Mississippi and assuring that abortions were performed by properly trained doctors who could take 
women to a hospital in an emergency,”12 the underlying implications of the law are obvious: that the 
state intended to decrease the number of abortions, thereby limiting reproductive rights, by using a 
ludicrous medical justification and unsubstantiated assertions about the fitness of the Jackson Clinic 
doctors.  
Mississippi is only one of the many states adopting TRAP laws to curtail abortion availability; 
Alabama, recently passed a law similar to MS HB 1390.13 TARP laws, through extreme overregulation of 
abortion providers,14 have been called “an incredibly effective attack on women’s reproductive freedom 
— rather than banning the procedure itself, abortion opponents hope to make it virtually inaccessible by 
8 A “ward of the state” can mean a myriad of things. In this context, it refers to child currently under the care of child 
protective services that lives in either a foster or group home, resulting in immense costs to the state, until the time that they 
are adopted or “age out” of the system at an age proscribed by previous state law (typically 18-21). 
9 Rachel K Jones, Lawrence B Finer, and Susheela Singh, "Characteristics of Us Abortion Patients, 2008," New York: 
Guttmacher Institute (2010). “Forty-two percent of women obtaining abortions in 2008 reported family incomes that 
qualified them as poor, and an additional 27% were low-income (i.e., had family incomes of 100–199% of the federal poverty 
level).” 
10 Campbell Robertson, "Judge Prevents Closing of Mississippi’s Sole Abortion Clinic,"  The New York Times(Apr 15, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/us/ruling-prevents-closing-of-mississippis-only-abortion-clinic.html. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Robbie Brown, "Mississippi’s Lone Abortion Clinic, Given Temporary Reprieve, Fields Rush of Calls," ibid.(2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/us/mississippis-lone-abortion-clinic-given-temporary-reprieve-fields-rush-of-
calls.html. 
13 Campbell Robertson, "Judge Prevents Closing of Mississippi’s Sole Abortion Clinic," ibid.(Apr 15, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/us/ruling-prevents-closing-of-mississippis-only-abortion-clinic.html. 
14 Most abortions occur within the first trimester, do not require surgery, and are outpatient procedures. They do not need to 
be performed by a physician; in fact, some states allow for telemedicine wherein a consultation with a medical employee, like 
an RN, allows for a prescription for medication that induces abortion in early stage pregnancies. 
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forcing clinics to close their doors — and it’s advancing in states across the country.”15 At present, 39 
states have laws that require abortions to be performed by a licensed physician16; others have stricter 
requirements like MS HB 1390’s hospital privileges provision.  
Moreover, this is part of a larger trend in state legislatures: passing laws that severely restrict the 
availability of abortions or burden the woman seeking the abortion. Anti-abortion legislation exploded 
in 2011, with legislators in 50 states introducing 1,100 pieces of legislation pertaining to reproductive 
rights with 135 enacted; 68% of which specifically addressed abortion.17 In 2012, the trend continued: 
43 more restrictions passed.18 In the first 
three months of 2013, 694 provisions 
were introduced that included abortion 
restriction provisions with 93 passing in 
at least one House of a given State’s 
Legislature.19 This occurred despite 
public approval for first trimester 
abortions consistently rising, with 54% 
of the public believing abortion should 
be legal “all or most of the time.”20 By first examining the landmark Supreme Court cases on abortion, 
then focusing on the intersection of medicine, science, and law proliferated in those cases and in the 
abortion debate generally, and finally assessing the consequences of new state and federal legislation on 
a woman’s right to choose, the sources instigating this anti-abortion trend will manifest itself. Through 
eradication of these sources, the woman’s right to make an informed, personal decision about termination 
of her pregnancy can be made.21 
15 Culp-Ressler, "Federal Judge Prevents Mississippi from Shutting Down Its Last Abortion Clinic," Center for American 
Progress Action Fund, http://thinkprogress.org/health/2013/04/16/1870931/mississippi-abortion-clinic-stays-open/. 
16 Guttmacher Institute, "State Policies in Brief: An Overview of Abortion Laws,"  
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf. 
17 Rachel Benson Gold and Elizabeth Nash, "Troubling Trend: More States Hostile to Abortion Rights as Middle Ground 
Shrinks," Guttmacher Pol Rev 15, no. 1 (2012). 
18 The Guttmacher Institute, "Laws Affecting Reproductive Health and Rights: 2012 State Policy Review," Annual State Policy 
Review 2013(2012). 
19 "Laws Affecting Reproductive Health and Rights: Trends in the First Quarter of 2013," Annual State Policy Review 
2013(2013). 
20 Liz  Marlantes, "Roe V. Wade at 40: A New Surge in Support for Abortion Rights,"  The Christian Science Monitor(January 
22, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/Decoder-Wire/2013/0122/Roe-v.-Wade-at-40-a-new-surge-in-
support-for-abortion-rights?nav=638859-csm_article-bottomRelated. 
21 I stress “her” here because men cannot get pregnant. They cannot have an abortion, and they do not have to endure 
childbirth. In fact, men can impregnate someone and never see that person again. Thus, the fact that men typically oppose 
abortion at higher rates and are the chief actors behind many of these anti-abortion provisions is significant. These restrictive 
laws are demonstrative of male hegemony and treat women as incompetent such that they are unable to make decisions 
regarding their own bodies. 
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Part I: Roe, Casey, and Carhart: A Motley Crew of Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
 Simplistically, Roe v. Wade (1973)22 is the grandfather of abortion jurisprudence, while Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey (1992)23 and Gonzales v. Carhart (2007)24 are the child and grandchild, 
respectively. The child strays from the path of the grandfather, carving out a new path but retaining most 
of the grandfather’s teachings. Two generations removed from the grandfather, the grandchild does not 
understand the grandfather, instead perceiving the grandfather as useless, except for birthday money. 
The grandchild is in a rebellious phase, taking the child’s inherited teachings and perverting them. The 
child says “You are grounded for a week,” and the grandchild eschews this punishment. When asked 
why, the grandchild responds, “I have been on the ground for a whole week! I never stepped foot on an 
airplane!” Thus, from grandfather to grandchild, the meaning is distorted and accumulates different 
valuations. Akin to Roe, Casey, and Carhart, Roe established a fundamental right, Casey limited that right 
but in a general manner, and Carhart essentially denied that the right was fundamental and that it 
necessitated limitations. In another view, Roe built a house with a door, Casey opened the door and 
performed renovations, and Carhart kept the façade of the home yet destroyed the remainder of it. It was 
Carhart that opened the can of worms for increasingly restrictive abortion legislation.25 
 Roe (1973) has always been a more contentious case than the Supreme Court’s 7-2 vote would 
indicate. Even Ruth Bader Ginsberg, a staunch advocate of reproductive freedom, feminism, gender 
equality, and a Supreme Court Justice averred, with respect to Roe, “it’s not that the judgment was wrong, 
but it moved too far, too fast” in guaranteeing the fundamental right for women to seek abortions 
legally.”26 Ginsberg wanted for the abortion issue to be decided by the states instead of abruptly by the 
Court. But, as history knows, the Court is skilled at “solving” issues of public disagreement.27 Roe is as 
famous as it is contentious: 84% of respondents to a survey conducted by C-SPAN responded with “Roe” 
to the stimulus “name any case heard by the U.S. Supreme Court.”28 After “Roe” revealed, in the later 
years after the decision, that she was now staunchly pro-life, it can be said, with confidence, that Roe has 
22 Roe V. Wade, 410 US 113(1973). 
23 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. V. Casey, 505 US 833(1992). 
24 Gonzales V. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610(2007). 
25 As Justice Ginsberg notes in her dissenting opinion in ibid. at 1653: “In candor, the Act, and the Court's defense of it, cannot 
be understood as anything other than an effort to chip away at a right declared again and again by this Court--and with 
increasing comprehension of its centrality to women's lives.” 
26 Adam Liptak, "Shadow of Roe V. Wade Looms over Ruling on Gay Marriage,"  The New York Times(March 23, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/24/us/roes-shadow-as-supreme-court-hears-same-sex-marriage-
cases.html?pagewanted=all. 
27 See Brown v. Board of Education; a unanimous decision that effectively made the entire Jim Crow system of the South 
invidious and unconstitutional. 
28 Linda Greenhouse and Reva B Siegel, "Before (and after) Roe V. Wade: New Questions About Backlash," Yale LJ 120(2010). 
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assumed a life of its own. 
 Roe resolved that the Due Process Clause and its penumbral rights protected the liberty of the 
abortion right, but it never used “equal protection” or “sex equality” to further enroot this right.29 With 
Griswold v. Connecticut30 having legitimized oral contraceptives under the postulation that certain 
relationships lie within a “zone of privacy created by several fundamental guarantees” found in the Third, 
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments,31 abortion codification was the next logical step in the 
establishment of constitutional protection for reproductive autonomy, contrary to Justice Ginsberg’s 
aforementioned statement. In this regard, Roe’s fundamental right to abortion was a rational decision, 
made with full awareness of the “sensitive and emotional nature of the abortion controversy.”32 
Furthermore, the rationality of Roe is bolstered by the Court’s explicit refusal to sanction any moral or 
theological suppositions as a “compelling state interest” such that it may licitly restrict the abortion 
right.33  
Weighing the detrimental effects that children have on female social mobility into account 
against Texas, or any other state’s,34 professed interest in protecting potential human life, the Roe court 
concludes that abortion legislation cannot sweep too broadly as to eclipse the right to privacy but must 
also serve the interests of the potential human life at the “compelling point” when the fetus is viable and 
can be considered a human life.35 In utilizing the phrases “compelling state interest,” “tailored to the 
recognized state interest,” and “fundamental right,” the Court’s decision was interpreted by many to 
imply a strict scrutiny standard by which State regulations should be judge despite never explicitly 
delineating the standard.36 The Court, by acknowledging the existence of limitations on the privacy right 
29 Reva B Siegel, "Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression," 
Emory LJ 56(2006). 
30 Griswold V. Connecticut, 381 US 479(1965). 
31 Ibid.at 485. In Roe, the Majority at 152 notes that “The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right to privacy;” 
however, the penumbral rights of the Constitution imply that there is a right to privacy inherent. Since a right not explicitly 
defined in the Constitution cannot be construed as a right denied (as per the Ninth Amendment), and the concept of 
“penumbral” rights of the Constitution were characterized before Griswold in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958), 
where it was called a “peripheral” right of the First Amendment, jurisprudence holds that there is an inherent yet implicit 
right to privacy in the Constitution. Roe determined that “privacy” as a right was either founded in “the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action” or in the Ninth Amendment, a right “broad 
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. “Roe Majority at 153. 
32 Roe V. Wade. Majority at 116. 
33 Ibid. Majority at 150.  
34 Roe concerns a Texas law prohibiting and criminalizing abortions except in cases where the woman’s health is at stake. The 
justification provided by Texas was that “life begins at conception,” so Texas has a responsibility to protect life once it begins. 
The Court, though, defiantly refuses to take a stance on this issue, relegating that question (of when life begins) to experts in 
theology, philosophy, and medicine. Concurrently, they do concede “at some point in time…the woman’s privacy is no longer 
sole and any right of privacy she possesses” must be balanced against the State interest in potential human life. Ibid. Majority 
at 159. 
35 Ibid. Majority at 162, 163. 
36 Valerie J Pacer, "Salvaging the Undue Burden Standard--Is It a Lost Cause: The Undue Burden Standard and Fundamental 
Rights Analysis," Wash. ULQ 73(1995).  Page 309. “Rather, under Roe, courts automatically found that the fundamental 
character of the individual right at stake warranted strict scrutiny. Under that standard, any state attempt to persuade a 
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whilst dictating only that viability, occurring roughly at the end of the first trimester of pregnancy, be 
the “compelling point” whence the female’s “liberty” loses its absolute character, failed to consider both 
changing technological advances to shorten the time frame which viability occurs and that a woman’s 
health may be at risk after viability.37  
The variability of viability poses an inherent problem; though the Court determined that the first 
trimester’s end approximated the duration during which legislatures could not pass restrictions on the 
right to obtain an abortion, new technology decreasing the “viability” time frame caused many abortion 
restriction laws to be permissible. The net effect was that “liberty” was not truly protected during Roe, 
only a vague notion retained constitutional protection. Though it was clear that a fetus was not protected 
under the Fourteenth Amendment and that “the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons 
in the whole sense,”38 the Court was ambiguous about whether the “compelling point” was a 
technological question of survivability or an ethical valuation of whether a fetus had reached the point 
where its development is significant enough to warrant protection from harm, conflating the 
technological with the ethical to cobble an untenable normative legal standard.39 If potentiality of life 
warrants restrictions on abortion, then women that act recklessly while pregnant and miscarry should 
be subject to penal sanctions if the woman is past viability. Potentially, Roe could have covertly sanctioned 
draconian societal control measures to dictate female action, a hypothesis bolstered by Roe’s assertion 
that abortion is a decision between physician and patient, depreciating the cognitive ability of a female 
to make a decision about termination of pregnancy without guidance, whether warranted or not. 
“Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. Yet 19 years after our holding that the 
Constitution protects a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy in its early stages, Roe v. Wade, 410 
U. S. 113 (1973), that definition of liberty is still questioned.”40 
Thus, the advent of Casey reformed some, but not nearly all, of the glaring issues with Roe while 
simultaneously facilitating the passage of abortion-restrictive laws throughout the states. Roe’s viability 
woman to abandon her choice violated the Fourteenth Amendment.” 
37 Nancy K. Rhoden, "Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe V. Wade," The Yale Law Journal 95, no. 4 (1986). Page 648. 
“By the early 1980’s, however, both technological advances and other Supreme Court decisions were raising additional 
questions about the meaning and continued validity of the first trimester/second trimester division.” 
38 Roe V. Wade.Majority at 162. 
39 "Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe V. Wade." Page 672. “Yet by implying…that technological survivability is itself 
determinative, the Court’s decisions have created the misleading impression that a scientific or technological fact can give rise 
to a normative legal standard without being influenced by moral values and analysis. An abortion cut-off should not depend 
on one aspect of the medical context while ignoring others…But, if viability ceases to coincide with late gestation, it will no 
longer achieve the same goals. Roe does not, however, require the law to abdicate control of women’s constitutional fate to 
technology.” 
40 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. V. Casey. Plurality at 844. 
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framework necessarily truncated available abortion options and mandated childbirth after viability,41 a 
concept antithetical to “liberty” and “fundamental rights.” 42 Casey, in its opening, affirms that it will 
“review once more the principles that define the rights of the woman and the legitimate authority of the 
State respecting the termination of pregnancies by abortion procedures”43 to both uphold “the essential 
holding” of the Roe while making the holding workable through clarification of its compulsory 
parameters.44 Ergo, the Court clarified the type of regulation that States were able to pass by abandoning 
the strict scrutiny review of Roe – that the State’s law must be related to a compelling governmental 
interest and that the law was tailored to achievement of that interest – and creating a new test balancing 
state and female interests.  
This test, named the “Undue Burden”45 test, was the metric by which the Court ruled on the 
constitutionality of five anti-abortion provisions in a Pennsylvania law: spousal notification stipulation, 
prohibition against minors seeking abortion, informed consent mandate to be read by the patient by a 
physician, 24-hour waiting period prior to acquiring an abortion, and obligatory reports from clinics 
regarding certain aspects of their provided abortion services.46 Only the spousal notification requirement 
41Walter Dellinger and Gene B. Sperling, "Abortion and the Supreme Court: The Retreat from Roe V. Wade," University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 138, no. 1 (1989). Page 93. “It has not been fashionable to emphasize the extent to which Roe was a 
case concerning a person's right to decide among medical treatment options, but there are substantial health and medical risks 
for women compelled by law to forgo an abortion procedure. All pregnancies present a significant health risk, but women are 
willing to assume it when they desire to have a child. When the government imposes the risk, though, it creates an 
extraordinary imposition.” 
42 A quandary that exists throughout abortion law is the notion of a “compelling interest” to preserve potential life forceful 
enough that a state has the ability to tamper with a woman’s reproductive autonomy. If the potential life is truly a state 
interest, why would the state allow for any abortions in cases of rape or incest? Pregnancies resulting from those cases are just 
as full of potential life as are those resulting from a careless sexual encounter. Furthermore, if the life of the mother is at stake, 
and potential life exists, the state, in allowing an abortion for the mother, acts against its own professed interest by terminating 
potential life; if it restricted medical abortion, the state would be sanctioning a death sentence for either one or both parties. If 
the state equates abortion with infanticide to such a degree that an organism living from the sustenance of another organism is 
allowed to continue its parasitic effect on the host organism without any potential avenues to redress the host organism’s 
grievances, it elevates the parasite over the host. “Preserving life,” either that of the fetus or that of the woman carrying the 
fetus must be a state initiative practiced consistently or it is not compelling. 
The idea that liberty is a continuum, not incidental,  coincides with Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 
543: "[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of 
the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This `liberty' is not a series of isolated points pricked out in 
terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from 
unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all 
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints . . . and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive 
judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their 
abridgment." 
43 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. V. Casey. Majority at 845. 
44 Ibid. Majority at 846. “Roe’s essential holding, the holding we reaffirm, has three parts. First is a recognition of the right of 
the woman to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State. Before 
viability, the State’s interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial 
obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the procedure. Second is a confirmation of the State’s power to restrict abortions 
after fetal viability, if the law contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman’s life or health. And third is the 
principle that the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the 
life of the fetus that may become a child. These principles do not contradict one another; and we adhere to each.” 
45 Ibid. Plurality at 877. “A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the 
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. A statute 
with this purpose is invalid because the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to 
inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.” Informing free choice, though, is necessarily coercion. If a decision is forcibly 
“informed,” then it can never be a decision made by an autonomous individual. 
46 Ibid. Plurality at 844. “At issue in these cases are five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as 
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was found to be unconstitutional, sanctioning States to enact copious types of abortion restrictions before 
and during the period of fetal viability. The State would be restricted in its legislation whence “a threshold 
level of interference”47 with the right to freedom of choice regarding abortion was reached. The State’s 
interest no longer needed to be compelling; the woman’s liberty is imperiled at the instant when the state’s 
regulations become “reasonably related” to their professed goals of the legislation “unless [the state 
measure] has an effect on [the woman’s] right of choice.”48  
The Court explicitly rejected condemnation of abortion as a legitimate interest in Casey, asserting 
it was the Court’s “obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code;”49 further 
asserting that a state may not pass anti-abortion legislation based on their belief that abortion is morally 
wrong, the state may express a “preference” for childbirth since it is in their interest of protecting fetal 
life50 in spite of its overtly moral implication.51 Thus, if a State’s goal is to “persuade” a woman seeking 
abortion to “choose life” instead, its informed consent regulation could stipulate that a doctor tell his 
patient that her “child” can feel pain if the procedure is performed. The words “child” and the dubious 
claim about fetal ability to feel pain52 are permissible because the Court saw “no reason why the State 
may not require doctors to inform a woman seeking an abortion of the availability of materials relating 
to the consequences to the fetus, even when those consequences have no direct relation to her health.”53 
amended in 1988 and 1989. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 3203–3220 (1990). Relevant portions of the Act are set forth in the 
Appendix. Infra, at 902. The Act requires that a woman seeking an abortion give her informed consent prior to the abortion 
procedure, and specifies that she be provided with certain information at least 24 hours before the abortion is performed. § 
3205. For a minor to obtain an abortion, the Act requires the informed consent of one of her parents, but provides for a 
judicial bypass option if the minor does not wish to or cannot obtain a parent’s consent. § 3206. Another provision of the Act 
requires that, unless certain exceptions apply, a married woman seeking an abortion must sign a statement indicating that she 
has notified her husband of her intended abortion. § 3209. The Act exempts compliance with these three requirements in the 
event of a “medical emergency,” which is defined in § 3203 of the Act. See §§ 3203, 3205(a), 3206(a), 3209(c). In addition to 
the above provisions regulating the performance of abortions, the Act imposes certain reporting requirements on facilities that 
provide abortion services. §§ 3207(b), 3214(a), 3214(f).” 
47 Pacer, "Salvaging the Undue Burden Standard--Is It a Lost Cause: The Undue Burden Standard and Fundamental Rights 
Analysis." Page 303. 
48 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. V. Casey. Plurality at 164. 
49 Ibid. at 177. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Since legislation is composed by a handful of human beings, each with ideological motives and ethical codes guiding their 
life decisions, before being introduced into a House of a state’s legislature, the legislation, from its naissance, is infected with 
bias. Protecting “fetal life” assumes that a fetus is a life, a moral position. The fact that some doctors are required to read 
informed consent provisions to their patients by law including this obviously ideological speech is apparently not a First 
Amendment violation according to Casey. An argument akin to this is posited in Scott W Gaylord and Thomas J Molony, "Casey 
and a Woman's Right to Know: Ultrasounds, Informed Consent, and the First Amendment," Elon University Law Legal Studies 
Research Paper, no. 2012-02 (2012). That article assets that “The Supreme Court's First Amendment decision in Casey 
expressly rejected the notion that a state may require distribution only of ideologically neutral information regarding abortion 
that is, information that not only is truthful and not misleading, but also that does not express a preference in favor of either 
childbirth or abortion, because Pennsylvania's challenged informational materials did express a preference for childbirth over 
abortion.” This is especially problematic because “In seeking to promote childbirth over abortion, the State exercises not only 
its "significant" authority to regulate the medical profession, but also its right to express its own views as a speaker: ‘The right 
to free speech, of course, includes the right to attempt to persuade others to change their views, and may not be curtailed 
simply because the speaker's message may be offensive to his audience.’” Page 632. 
52 Barbara Hewson, "Reproductive Autonomy and the Ethics of Abortion," Journal of Medical Ethics 27(2001). 
53 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. V. Casey. At 882. 
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As concluded by Professor Sonia Suter, Casey signaled that “the Court no longer distinguished between 
disclosure aimed at informing versus persuading or influencing.”54 
After Casey, though, there was “no going back” on abortion legality as an essential liberty.55 
However, its holdings solidified that States could restrict this liberty as long as their legislation did not 
explicitly state “Abortion is amoral.”56 Casey invited a bevy of new abortion restrictions; with their 
abandonment of the trimester structure as the threshold for abortion legislation, the floodgates opened. 
Many state legislators, in creating new laws addressing the entire span of pregnancy, framed their anti-
abortion provisions as a safeguard for women, justifying restrictions and regulations on the precept that 
women have a “right to know” the consequences of abortion. They professed concern for female safety 
(physician hospital privileges restriction; late term abortion restriction; telemedicine restriction), female 
mental health (“post-abortion” syndrome57; appeals to motherhood to sanction counseling mandates, 
“regret” for decision to abort), female physical health (inserting information about “cancer” caused by 
abortion and issues with future fertility), and female lack of fortitude to make the “right” decisions about 
their reproductive health (ultrasound requirements, waiting periods, restrictions on minors, fetal 
heartbeat requirements).58  
Professor Riva Siegel describes this anti-abortion strategy as “woman-protective, choice-based, 
increment list restrictions on abortion;”59 by reframing the issue of abortion in terms of women’s rights, 
the ease with which one could explicitly identify an impermissible, morality-based law against abortion 
54 Sonia M Suter, "The Politics of Information: Informed Consent in Abortion and End-of-Life Decision Making," Am. JL and 
Med. 39(2013). Page 22. 
55 David J Garrow, "Abortion before and after Roe V. Wade: An Historical Perspective," Alb. L. Rev. 62(1998). “Casey resolved 
the basic constitutional question of abortion for all time. The Court has made crystal clear that after Casey, there is simply no 
going back… It ought to be very difficult for anyone to read the Casey opinion with any sort of independent or quasi-objective 
attitude toward this question and come away from that opinion with any doubt about whether this is a declaration on which 
the Court somehow could ever go back.” Page 845. 
56 With the “undue burden” standard, the state does not bear the burden of proof in a challenge to legislation; the burden of 
proof rests of the individual to prove that the legislature’s motivations were not neutral but were morally or ethically 
motivated. Pacer elaborates on this principle by postulating that “under the Casey undue burden standard, a state may avoid 
this strict [scrutiny] of its legislative motive. As long as a law does not create an undue burden on the exercise of a 
fundamental right, the law can permissibly coerce people into conforming to the majoritarian morality.” Pacer Page 317. 
57 “The concept of “post-abortion syndrome” … was first proposed in the early 1980s by Vincent Rue, who has since become 
an international authority in the antiabortion movement … In 1981, Rue—then a professor of family relations who directed 
the Sir Thomas More Clinics of Southern California—testified before the Senate about abortion’s social effects. His testimony, 
which described abortion as … “a psychological Trojan Horse for women”—a claim Rue advanced by attacking the pervasive 
clinical view within psychology that the procedure had “only temporary, nonpathological, and limited adverse emotional 
sequelae. In Rue’s view, ‘guilt and abortion have virtually become synonymous. It is superfluous to ask whether patients 
experience guilt; it is axiomatic that they will.’” Reva B Siegel, "The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of 
Woman-Protective Anti-Abortion Argument," Duke Law Journal 57(2008). Page 117. 
58  By enforcing the notion that women benefited from state-mandated pre-abortion counseling and that female minors were 
not mentally able to formulate decisions without the help of their parents reinforced gender stereotypes about female 
weakness, a “significant departure from the women's movement's initial goals, which had discussed abortion as a locus for 
empowerment. Instead, the abortion doctrine now carried the very same antiquated perceptions of women that the movement 
had initially intended to undo.”  Victoria Baranetsky, "Aborting Dignity: The Abortion Doctrine after Gonzales V. Carhart," 
Harv. JL & Gender 36(2013). Page 143.  
59 Reva B Siegel, "The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions," University of 
Illinois Law Review, Baum Lecture (2007). Page 1023. 
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decrease significantly. Casey, articulation of gender normativity, and states’ increased discretion in the 
sphere of enacting legislation burdening the abortion right (but not amounting to an undue burden) 
primed the “harm-to-women” strategy utilized by the anti-abortion movement. Furthermore, by vividly 
depicting the process of “partial-birth abortion” (late term abortion) and the potentiality of harm, 
physical or mental, to women that receive the procedure, partial-birth abortion bans spread. Federally, 
the Partial-Birth Abortion Act was upheld in Gonzales v. Carhart as a constitutional restriction on 
abortion. Ergo, the interest of the mother, especially in late term abortions, was the same as the child – to 
live and be protected from abortion – thus engendering the mother and child reunion rhetoric60 in anti-
abortion discourse.  
Part II: Gonzales v. Carhart: Medicine, Science, and Social Mores 
“…though the abortion decision may originate within the zone of conscious and belief, it is more than a 
philosophic exercise. Abortion is a unique act. It is an act fraught with consequences for others […] 
Though abortion is conduct, it does not follow that the State is entitled to proscribe it in all instances. 
That is because the liberty of the woman is unique to the human condition and so unique to the law. 
The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that 
only she must bear…”61 
 There are many medically recognized types of abortion. “Partial-Birth” is not one of them.62 
Therein lays the first problem with the Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart: it was subjected to bias 
from its inception. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, uses the terms “child” and “fetus” and 
“mother” and “woman” almost interchangeably, subconsciously reinforcing the gender 
disempowerment faced by women as a result of their uteruses. The fact that women bear children does 
not force every woman to become a mother; the fact that some women experience trauma after abortions 
does not mean that type of abortion should be made illicit for all women. Especially with respect to the 
60 This is my term, but it is derived from both my love of Paul Simon and a piece by Reva Siegel. “Thus, the only way that we 
can help either the mother or her child is to help both. Conversely, if we hurt either, we hurt both. Properly understood, the 
interests of women and the unborn are convergent and harmonious; abortion harms women and the unborn both. The 
abortion debate, then, is not about women’s rights versus the rights of the unborn, because the rights of mother and her child 
can never be truly opposed to each other.” "The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective 
Anti-Abortion Argument."  
61 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. V. Casey. At 852. This eloquent passage ends with “That these sacrifices have from 
the beginning of the human race been endured by woman with a pride that ennobles her in the eyes of others and gives to the 
infant a bond of love cannot alone be grounds for the State to insist she make the sacrifice. Her suffering is too intimate and 
personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman’s role, however dominant that vision has been 
in the course of our history and our culture.” In Gonzales, the Court summarizes this quote as “Whether to have an abortion 
requires a difficult and painful moral decision, Casey, 505 U. S., at 852–853, which some women come to regret.” Gonzales V. 
Carhart. Slip at 6. 
62 Gonzales V. Carhart. (Ginsberg, dissenting at Slip 2). Partial birth abortion is a term “neither recognized in the medical 
literature nor used by physicians who perform second-trimester abortions…The medical community refers to the procedure as 
either dilation & extraction (D&X) or intact dilation and evacuation (intact D&X).” 
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increasing number of barriers to obtaining an abortion that were enacted between Casey and Gonzales, 
the persons that would seek a later-term abortion would most likely be those that were burdened and 
unable to have an abortion at an earlier time. As D&X is most routinely used in later-trimester abortions, 
its prohibition fundamentally compels these women to have unwanted children. To understand the 
inherent gender biases, flawed science, and misguided intentions found in Carhart, it is imperative to 
grasp the range of abortion types, the frequency of abortion, the demographics of abortion recipients, the 
(general) scientific and medical consensus about abortion’s effects, and the consequences that unwanted 
pregnancies have on society in both the fiscal and communal sense.63 
 First and foremost, it should be recognized that abortion is the only medical procedure that is 
regulated by the government and that carries criminal penalties for violation of those regulations. 
Abortion exceptionalism64 is the concept that abortion, in the United States, is treated as a medical 
procedure wholly different from all other medical procedures. Because of the Hyde Amendment, 
Medicaid, or any other federal funds may not be used to pay for abortion procedures except in cases of 
rape, incest, and where the woman’s life is at risk; states may still use their own funds to provide abortion 
assistance, and seventeen states utilize this practice.65 Conversely, thirty-two states explicitly prohibit 
assisting in procuring an abortion financially unless the funds are provided by the federal government – 
so only in cases of potential death, rape and incest.66 Furthermore, forty-six states allow the right of 
refusal, meaning health care providers can refuse to participate in an abortion; forty-three states extend 
this right to institutions (but sixteen of these states only allow religious and private institutions to exercise 
this right).67 Private insurers are restricted from providing abortion coverage in eight states except in 
cases where the woman’s life is in danger.68  
 Interestingly, persons that qualify for Medicaid coverage are, by definition, poor and unlikely to 
63 This is, obviously, an incomplete list of the factors necessary to fully comprehend to accurately assess Carhart. Incidentally, 
this illustrates a fundamental problem with the undue burden test: it focuses on each restrictive provision in the abstract. 
Taken in the aggregate and compounded with the passage of more restrictive laws, the cumulative effect of these restrictions 
cannot be considered anything but an undue burden on a woman’s freedom to exercise her liberty with respect to her body, 
her future, and her self-ideology. 
64 Ian Vanderwalker, "Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling Laws Mandate Violations of Medical Ethics," 
Mich. J. Gender & L. 19(2012). Page 3. Abortion Exceptionalism encompasses a vast number of burdens that are unique to 
abortion procedures while the super-majority of medical procedures are guided by the same standards established by the 
medical licensing board. This lacuna in regulation of other ethically questionable activities is succinctly summarized by 
Vanderwalker: “there are no similar provisions prohibiting taxpayer money from funding other activities that are morally 
offensive to large numbers of Americans, such as the production of highly destructive military weaponry.” 
65 Magda Schaler-Haynes et al., "Abortion Coverage and Health Reform: Restrictions and Options for Exchange-Based 
Insurance Markets," U. Pa. JL & Soc. Change 15(2011). 
66 Institute, "State Policies in Brief: An Overview of Abortion Laws". 
67 Ibid. Still, in what situation would a doctor be forced to participate in an abortion? With all the regulations surrounding 
who is licensed to perform abortions, it is highly unlikely that this situation would occur. 
68 Ibid. 
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be financially able to support a child without State assistance. With surgical abortions ranging from $300 
to $950 during the first trimester69 and $300 to $80070 for medication abortion during the first trimester, 
and later-gestation abortions ranging into the thousands (and illegal in most cases), those that cannot 
afford an abortion during the early stages of pregnancy are typically priced out of the market.71 Thus, 
the effect of being unable to receive Medicaid funding, compounded with the spillover effect of restrictive 
laws (on both Clinics through regulation and Women through lost wages due to waiting periods) and 
the high cost of later abortions, has a wholly and targeted detrimental effect on the ability of women in 
lower income brackets to exercise their fundamental right to make a decision regarding the termination 
of their pregnancy. If anything, the refusal to fund abortions for those in the lower income bracket is 
wholly detrimental to the welfare system of the state, given the comparative cost of providing food stamps 
for a child for eighteen years versus the aforementioned cost of a single abortion.72 . Though states claim 
that those opposed to abortion would not want to “indirectly fund” something they morally oppose, those 
same people, indirectly forcing others into unwanted pregnancies, would likely find it distasteful to have 
their taxes raised in order to fund someone’s unwanted child. 
 Public Health Policy consultant and Columbia University professor Magda Schaler-Haynes 
observes that “Women who delay abortions into the second trimester of pregnancy are disproportionately 
people of color and more likely to be lower-income than those who obtain abortions in the first 
trimester.”73 In their 2008 study of abortion patients in the US, the Guttmacher Institute’s data vividly 
illustrates the profile of women typically seeking abortions: a plurality of abortions are performed on 
younger, women of color, either without insurance or covered by Medicaid, unmarried, with at least one 
child, in the lower income brackets.74 Equal protection questions automatically arise on multiple levels 
69 "What Happens During an Abortion - in-Clinic Abortion Cost," Planned Parenthood Federation of America Inc., 
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/health-topics/abortion/in-clinic-abortion-procedures-4359.asp. 
70 "Abortion Pill - Cost of Abortion Pill - Medication Abortion," Health Info & Services: Abortion 2013(2013). 
71 Marshall H. Medoff, "The Response of Abortion Demand to Changes in Abortion Costs," Social Indicators Research 87, no. 2 
(2008). “The price of obtaining an abortion is a significant determinant of the abortion choice…This funding also implies that 
a restrictive abortion law may have a spillover effect on the abortion demand. The spillover effect of a restrictive abortion law 
is the increase in the abortion price that results from the higher expenses imposed on abortion providers because of the 
restrictive abortion law...Since restrictive abortion laws do not violate women's right to have an abortion, then it could be 
argued that restrictive abortion laws may have the not so incidental effect of pricing some women with unwanted pregnancies 
out of the market.” 
72 Hill argues that insurance bans have no true purpose other than to limit abortion availability. “Insurance bans do not 
further the purported purpose of encouraging childbirth. The Court in Casey stated that the government may encourage 
childbirth by ensuring that a woman's choice to obtain an abortion was thoughtful and informed, and by enacting laws to 
promote respect for fetal life. An insurance law, by contrast, does not inform a woman's choice with any new information, but 
instead simply increases the out-of-pocket cost for an abortion. Coercing a woman through financial pressure violates Casey's 
mandate that abortion laws must serve to inform a woman's free choice, not hinder it..”  Lucy E Hill, "Seeking Liberty's Refuge: 
Analyzing Legislative Purpose under Casey's Undue Burden Standard," Fordham L. Rev. 81(2012). Page 406/. 
73 Schaler-Haynes et al., "Abortion Coverage and Health Reform: Restrictions and Options for Exchange-Based Insurance 
Markets." Page 328. 
74 Jones, Finer, and Singh, "Characteristics of Us Abortion Patients, 2008." 
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because of the number of cross-cutting identity cleavages, some categories triggering heightened 
scrutiny, disproportionately affected by abortion restrictions.  
 On a larger scale, though, abortion affects women of all backgrounds: an estimated 1 in 3 women 
have an abortion by age 45, and abortion is one of the most common medical procedures for those of 
reproductive age.75 In 2009, 48 reporting areas76 submitted information on the abortions provided in 
their states to the Center for Disease Control (CDC)77; 784,507 abortions were reported for that year. 
The abortion rate (number of abortions for women aged 15-44 years old per 1,000 women) for 2009 
15.1 abortions; the abortion ratio (ratio of the number of abortions to number of live births per 1,000 
live births) was 227 abortions.78 57.1% of abortions occurred among women aged 20-29.79 64% of 
abortions occurred before or at 8 weeks gestation, 91.7% before or at 13 weeks, 7% between 14 and 20 
weeks, and 1.3% at greater than or at 21 weeks.80 By method, 74.2% involved curettage (surgery) at ≤ 
13 weeks gestation, 16.5% utilized medical abortion (the abortion pill) during early gestation, 8.1% 
involved curettage at more than 13 weeks gestation, and the remaining types of procedures were 
“uncommon;”81 ergo, D&X is rare occurrence in the overall portrait of abortion. Most likely, D&X, with 
its increased risk of health complications, limited availability, and higher price, is not the method of 
choice but rather the method utilized only out of necessity. Thus, it is even more condemning that most 
women electing to undergo D&X are denied that right. 
 Imbued with race, class, and gender implications, the decision in Gonzales v. Carhart looks 
suspect on its face. The fact that a similar case, Stenberg v. Carhart82, involving a Nebraska “Partial Birth 
Abortion” ban, was struck down by the Court only 7 years earlier yet, as jurisprudence, was discarded 
by  the Court in its analysis is also suspicious. Synchronously, a cursory glance at the Opinion exhibits 
tremendous gender bias. Reva Siegel chides the decision as being a “discussion of gender-paternalist 
justification for abortion restrictions.”83 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, spared no detail when 
describing D&X and intact D&X.84 His romanticiaztion of the relationship between mother and child is 
75 Ibid. 
76 Reporting areas include the District of Columbia; New York City, and 46 states. California, Delaware, Maryland, and New 
Hampshire do not report. Karen Pazol et al., "Abortion Surveillance—United States, 2009," Morbidity and mortality weekly 
report. Surveillance summaries (Washington, DC: 2002) 61, no. 8 (2012). Page 2. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 




82 Stenberg V. Carhart, 530 US 914(2000). Hereafter, Stenberg. 
83 Siegel, "The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Anti-Abortion Argument." At 110. 
84 Gonzales V. Carhart.. Majority at 1634. Justice Kennedy accepts as factual that the process of D&X and intact D&X bears 
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verging on saccharine85. His degradation of women to their stereotypical gender roles, further implying 
females have weakness of heart, lack of foresight, and inability to understand consequences, is 
embarrassing given his stature as one of the nine most important legal minds in the United States.86 The 
most deplorable conclusion drawn by the opinion is that, when weighing “mother” and “future child” 
with respect to their fundamental rights, the “future child,” once not even considered a “whole person” 
as per Roe,87 retains more rights than the mother.88 
 In upholding a restrictive abortion law without any shred of factual basis, instead qualifying the 
“disturbing similarity to the killing of a newborn infant;” in accordance with Congress’s justification for passing the law, citing 
Casey’s assertion that “where [the state] has a rational basis to act, and it does not impose an undue burden, the State may use 
its regulatory power... in furtherance of its legitimate interests ...” Therefore, Justice Kennedy assumes that his Congress’s 
perception that D&X is “disturbingly similar” to infanticide is sufficient to constitute an abridgement of female autonomy, in 
spite of his remark  that the Act purposes to “place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion,” which 
would implicate an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose. 
Some highlights of Justice Kennedy’s horror story depiction of D&E and intact D&E include: 
“The Act proscribes a method of abortion in which a fetus is killed just inches before completion of the birth 
process.” At 1633 
The fetus is “deliver[ed] . . . [so that] in the case of a head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the body 
of the mother, or, in the case of breech presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of 
the mother.” At 1627. 
“Some doctors, especially later in the second trimester, may kill the fetus a day or two before performing the surgical 
evacuation. They inject digoxin or potassium chloride into the fetus, the umbilical cord, or the amniotic fluid. Fetal 
demise may cause contractions and make greater dilation possible. Once dead, moreover, the fetus' body will soften, 
and its removal will be easier.” At 1621. 
“The doctor, often guided by ultrasound, inserts grasping forceps through the woman's cervix and into the uterus to 
grab the fetus. The doctor grips a fetal part with the forceps and pulls it back through the cervix and vagina, 
continuing to pull even after meeting resistance from the cervix. The friction causes the fetus to tear apart. For 
example, a leg might be ripped off the fetus as it is pulled through the cervix and out of the woman. The process of 
evacuating the fetus piece by piece continues until it has been completely removed. A doctor may make 10 to 15 
passes with the forceps to evacuate the fetus in its entirety, though sometimes removal is completed with fewer 
passes. Once the fetus has been evacuated, the placenta and any remaining fetal material are suctioned or scraped 
out of the uterus.” At 1621. 
“In an intact D & E procedure the doctor extracts the fetus in a way conducive to pulling out its entire body, instead 
of ripping it apart.” At 1622. 
85 Ibid. Some highlights of Justice Kennedy’s conflagration of the mother-child relationship, uniting their interests include: 
“It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort must struggle with grief more anguished 
and sorrow more profound when she learns, only after the event, what she once did not know: that she allowed a 
doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a child assuming the human 
form.” At 1634. 
“While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women 
come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.” At 1634. 
“Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love the mother has for her child. The Act 
recognizes this reality as well.” At 1634. 
86 Ibid. Some highlights of Justice’s Kennedy’s paternalistic view of women as weak, passive agents unable to ration include: 
“[It cannot] be doubted that most women considering an abortion would deem the impact on the fetus relevant, if 
not dispositive, to the decision. In attempting to ensure that a woman apprehend the full consequences of her 
decision, the State furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only to 
discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully informed.” At 1634. 
“The State's interest in respect for life is advanced by the dialogue that better informs the political and legal systems, 
the medical profession, expectant mothers, and society as a whole of the consequences that follow from a decision to 
elect a late-term abortion.” At 1634.” 
“The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a choice is well informed.” At 1634. 
87 Roe V. Wade. Justice Blackmun concurring in part at 162. “In short, the unborn have never been recognized in the law as 
persons in the whole sense.” 
88 This would tend to support arguments made by anti-abortion advocates regarding fetal personhood. Mark Strasser agrees 
with me. “First, if there is another change on the Court, for example, if Justice Ginsberg retires, then the abortion 
jurisprudence may undergo a wholesale revision. Suppose that the post-Ginsberg Court were to hold that the Federal 
Constitution neither protects nor prohibits abortion, but instead permits the States to regulate it as they deem fit. n109 In that 
event, the personhood amendments would do a significant amount of work because even very early abortions would be 
impermissible unless, for example, a plausible self-defense argument could be offered.” Mark Strasser, "The Next 
Battleground? Personhood, Privacy, and Assisted Reproductive Technologies," (2012). 
Page | 14 
 
                                                          
Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2003 by anecdotal accounts of women distressed after the procedure, a 
biased state interest, and the supposition that women could not be trusted to be informed about their role 
as mothers with regard to attempting to undergo the procedures, Carhart signaled to the anti-abortion 
movement that the composition of the Court had changed. Without Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
(replaced by the thoroughly insipid Justice Alito), the ideological balance of the Court had shifted, 
inspiring anti-abortion groups to proliferate restrictive anti-abortion legislation across the country.89 
Carhart reinforced the trimester framework by essentially prohibiting abortions outside the first trimester 
through upholding the illegality of D&X, the procedure most commonly used in the uncommon 
procedure of late-term abortions; moreover, the aforementioned viability questions that blossomed after 
Roe forced abortion law to become interwoven, again, with a “jurisprudence of doubt.”  
Part III: Personhood, Ultrasounds, Fetal Heartbeats, Waiting Periods, and the Future 
 With the possibility of first trimester restrictions (and prohibition otherwise) of the abortion 
procedure and the further enfeeblement of the Undue Burden standard, the rights of women articulated 
in Roe practically vanished with Carhart. With the majority of state legislatures controlled by Republicans 
in the wake of the 2010 midterm election overhaul, and the majority of state governors affiliated with 
the Republican party, 2011 initiated open season on abortion after Carhart solidified the right to 
disregard women in the abortion question. These legislatures have seen the new composition of the Court, 
mostly Catholic and more socially conservative, and read their decisions indicating a fundamental 
“mistrust of women,” encouraging the passage of more biased laws.90 Although this has a detrimental 
effect on women, with pregnancy carrying a higher mortality rate than abortion91 and the risk of mental 
health repercussions from pregnancy exceeding those from abortion92, the ideological rhetoric of the 
89 “As further proof of the extent which the Carhart decision was informed by moral valuations, not jurisprudence, “Pro-
choice activists were not the only ones to recognize that the Carhart decision relied on outmoded, traditional stereotypes of 
women. The week after the Supreme Court announced its decision in Carhart, Richard Land of the Southern Baptist 
Convention (known for their conservative image of women) hailed, "Thank God for President Bush, and thank God for Chief 
Justice John Roberts and Associate Justice Samuel Alito." Right-wing conservatives who protested the right to abortion 
considered Carhart a major victory.  The opinion simultaneously revived more aggressive tactics by right wing conservatives. 
n151 But most importantly, the decision marked the fact that the pro-life movement's long-fought battle over the rhetoric of 
abortion was won. Depicting the procedure as a bloody execution was finally included in a Supreme Court opinion.” 
Baranetsky, "Aborting Dignity: The Abortion Doctrine after Gonzales V. Carhart." Page 145-146. 
90 Vanderwalker, "Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling Laws Mandate Violations of Medical Ethics." Page 
44. “Legislatures have been encouraged by the fact that the Supreme Court upheld Pennsylvania's biased counseling in Casey, 
as well as the mistrust of women apparent in the Court's decisions, to enact biased counseling laws that go far beyond the 
Pennsylvania statute that was before the Court in 1992.” 
91 The supposition that anti-abortion laws are enacted in the interest of female health is particularly ludicrous in this respect. 
One state’s mandate informed consent booklet discouraging abortion enumerates all the worst possible outcomes of abortion 
before, in fine print at the bottom of the page, mentions that childbirth also carries health risks:  “Pregnancy and birth is 
usually a safe, natural process although complications can occur."  This statement occurs without recognition that abortion is 
also usually a safe procedure. The state’s interests lie in framing the abortion choice such that it may prompt “false beliefs 
about the relative risks of abortion and childbirth,” not in providing actual informed consent. Ibid. Page 42. 
92 Post-Partum depression is recognized by the vast majority of physicians as a legitimate condition. Post-Abortion Syndrome is 
not. A large-scale study conducted to evaluate the claim that abortion grotesquely disfigures a woman’s mental health 
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anti-abortion movement is louder and free from the restraints of Roe.  
 After passing “the most restrictive abortion law in the country”93 at the time, including heartbeat 
provisions, a restriction on abortions performed after six weeks of gestation, mandatory ultrasound 
provisions, the elimination of licit embryonic testing and sex selection, and with a mandate that abortion 
providers have hospital-admitting privileges,94 North Dakota Governor Jack Dalrymple released a press 
statement: “Although the likelihood of this measure surviving a court challenge remains in question, this 
bill is nevertheless a legitimate attempt by a state legislature to discover the boundaries of Roe v. Wade. 
Because the U.S. Supreme Court has allowed state restrictions on the performing of abortions and because 
the Supreme Court has never considered this precise restriction in HB 1456, the constitutionality of this 
measure is an open question.”95 The fact that, forty years after Roe, the constitutionality of abortion 
measures is yet to be solidified is troubling. Likewise, there is a palpable threat of the Court deciding in 
favor of North Dakota were the case to reach that level. Women denied abortions are twice as likely to 
be victims of domestic abuse than women able to obtain abortions; coerced childbirth does not produce 
a loving “mother and child reunion” but rather a life below the poverty line, fraught with anxiety, and, 
most importantly, with the responsibility of caring for an unwanted child.96 In a country where a New 
Mexico state legislator introduced legislation stipulating that a woman receiving an abortion, even after 
a rape, is guilty of a felony,97 Virginia’s requirement that women undergo an ultrasound prior to 
obtaining an abortion is closer to state-mandated sexual abuse than to a medical procedure,98  and the 
murder trial of an abortion doctor is front-page news, Roe’s forty-first birthday looks to be bleak. But, in 
the midst of all the abortion-bashing vitriol, occasionally the human side of abortion appears. A former 
abortion hotline employee, in an article recalling her experience, reminded the portion of the population 
concluded that “rates of a first-time psychiatric contact before and after a first-trimester induced abortion are similar. This 
finding does not support the hypothesis that there is an overall increased risk of mental disorders after first-trimester induced 
abortion.” Trine Munk-Olsen et al., "Induced First-Trimester Abortion and Risk of Mental Disorder," New England Journal of 
Medicine 364, no. 4 (2011). Page 338. 
93 That is, until Kansas passed its anti-abortion law, declaring that life begins “at fertilization.” John Hna, "Gov. Brownback 
Signs Sweeping Anti-Abortion Bill," Kansas City Star, http://www.kansascity.com/2013/04/19/4191137/kan-governor-
signs-sweeping-anti.html. 
94 Sarah Kliff, "What North Dakota’s Six-Week Abortion Ban Says About the Antiabortion Movement," (2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/03/15/what-north-dakotas-6-week-abortion-ban-says-
about-the-antiabortion-movement/. 
95 Jack Dalarymple, Press Re;ease, March 26, 2013. 
96 “The researchers found that “a year after being denied an abortion, 7 percent reported an incident of domestic violence in 




97 Katie McDonough, "New Mexico Lawmaker Resurrects Bill Making Abortion after Rape a Felony," Salon Media Group, Inc., 
http://www.salon.com/2013/01/28/new_mexico_lawmaker_resurrects_bill_making_abortion_after_rape_a_felony/. 
98 Sara Dover, "Virginia Ultrasound Bill Goes into Effect Sunday,"  CBS News(Jun 29, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
201_162-57464167/virginia-ultrasound-bill-goes-into-effect-sunday/. 
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that does not believe “legitimate rape” to be a “legitimate” phrase to stand in solidarity: 
“My work on the hot line was almost half my lifetime ago. Thinking about it reminds me of a 
time when I bore witness to the terrible truths of womanhood in America. An unwanted 
pregnancy can hurtle a woman onto a perilous landscape where the laws of man don’t protect 
her. You don’t hear about this dark side of life very often in the daylight. But look around you. 




99 Kerry Sheridam, "My Job at the Abortion Hot Line," Salon Media Group, Inc., 
http://www.salon.com/2013/05/01/my_job_at_the_abortion_hot_line/. 
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Addendum 06/20/2014 
 In my personal life, I have been very open about the fact that I am a survivor of rape. On 
December 23, 2010, I was unconscious and taken advantage of in the vilest way possible. I did not file a 
report with the police or university administration because, at the time, I did not know that what had 
occurred constituted rape. I found out months later, at a dinner, when I asked if it was rape if someone 
had sex with you while you were unconscious. The table started laughing until one of my friends spoke 
up and said, “Guys, I think she’s serious.” It was then I could put a name to the terrible feelings inside – 
the self-loathing, the blame, the violation, the anger, and the myriad of other emotions that still rage 
within me. Even if I had known that rape had occurred at the moment of the act, I would not have 
reported it. The embarrassment of explaining what had happened to me to multiple parties directly 
following the sexual violence I experienced would have been far too daunting for my mental state at that 
time.  
 In my mind, those that limit the “choice” to have an abortion to those that have been victims of 
rape or incest do not understand the dynamics of the mind of a person that has been through such 
harrowing experiences. Furthermore, those that cite numbers indicating that a low percentage of 
rape/incest as named cause for abortion also do not understand the aforementioned dynamic. But, it is 
the rhetoric of the “legitimate rape” crowd, the “rape and incest only” cohort, and the “life begins at 
conception” that couples the tendency for rape/incest victims to blame themselves for the violence 
against them and the pregnancy it begot. The shame is put on those that choose – those that allow 
themselves to be raped or choose to “end a life” for their own needs – but the shame should be cast upon 
those that create this patriarchy that systematically instills that shame for all those that violate the sacred 
sacrament of protestant chastity, whether willingly or unwillingly. 
 As states pass more restrictive abortion laws, the Court is bound to act eventually. Until then, the 
free expression of woman as woman is hampered. When the law says “choice” where no choice 
realistically exists, like laws restricting abortion after 8 weeks of probable conception, the law is giving 
women the façade of freedom whilst usurping that same freedom. If I were to have gotten pregnant as a 
result of my rape, I would have sought an abortion with almost 100% certainty. If they had asked me the 
reason for my abortion, I would have said anything but “I was raped.” With the number of unreported 
rapes almost gargantuan, I hypothesize that the hypothetical manner which I would deal with a 
pregnancy resulting from my rape is far less hypothetical for many women in this country. 
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